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•  The New Navy Fighting Machine Study designed a fleet in 2009 to support 
an affordable bimodal navy described qualitatively in 2007 
•  The study also demonstrated CS-21 Strategy to be affordable and viable 
•  NNFM ground rule: Only existing ships, aircraft, or systems allowed 
•  To press to reduce costs, some ships were undercosted, e.g., $10B for CVN 
•  Neither constraint applies in this briefing. Navy costs used throughout 
•  The bimodal navy serves as a foundation for a  comprehensive expanded 
scalable future fleet under favorable Navy budget circumstances 
•  But the budget is more likely to be cut than to expand 
•  SCN is proxy for total fleet costs. For example: 
–   Annual APN is actually bigger than SCN 
–  Life Cycle Costs are equally important 
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Purpose and Justification 
•  Purpose is to illustrate a sequence of transitions to a bimodal 
fleet 
•  “Usually more than one piece of technology is required to 
create a revolution.” 
–  Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, p. 239 
•  “The proponents of competing paradigms are always at least 
slightly at cross-purposes. . . The competition between 
paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by 
proofs. . . .the transition . . .must occur all at once (though not 
necessarily in an instant) . . .” 
–  T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd Ed, pp. 148-150 
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BLUF: A Transition Sequence 
•  Start Now: Build a flotilla of 50-plus missile corvettes 
•  Start Now: Build other littoral ships for ASW, MCM, NGFS 
•  Start Now: Non-nuclear SSKs to complement SSNs 
•  Underway Now: Underwater systems focused on the China Seas 
•  Virtually Underway: Holiday on amphibious assault ships; replace 
some with fast or efficient amphibious lift by 2022 
•  Design Now: Next generation blue water surface combatants to 
enter fleet in 2031 
•  Start Soon: Some small, fast CLF ships to sustain littoral fleet 
•  Awaiting Aircraft Decisions: Smaller carriers to replace inevitably 
fewer CVNs 
•  No Solution: Cost of Strategic Deterrence (SSBN and TBMD) 
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Historical Transitions—a Sense of Pace 
•  Battleship Era: 60 years (1880 to 1940) 
•  Aircraft Carrier Era: 40 years (1940 to 1980) 
•  Missile Ship  Era: 30 years (1980 to 2010) 
•  Era of Unmanned and Robotic Systems: (2010 to .... ?) 
•  A U. S. Navy transition is overdue 
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1. A Flotilla of Missile Combatants 
•  Missile age created a Billy the Kid effect: deadly things in small, 
sneaky packages 
•  Missile corvettes will ambush in cluttered littoral waters 
•  Corvettes do missile warfare only. ASW, MCM are different ships 
•  LCS SCN $$ after #24 can be a $14B planning wedge 
•  Action: Build 8 corvettes of proven designs that cost $100M each 
•  Swedish Visby class w/o its ASW and MCM exemplifies 
•  First generation helps develop tactics, train, and improve designs 
•  Next generation may be smaller, cheaper, and be manned, optionally 
manned, and unmanned 
•  Aim at flotilla of 64 combatants: $14B buys that many with money 
left over for ASW, MCM, NGFS, and logistics ships 
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2. Three Other Littoral Warship Roles 
•  12 MCM ships. Put LCS’s MCM modules in 15 knot ships 
•  12 ASW ships for shallow water escort or submarine hunting 
•  12 NGFS ships to operate inshore. Weapon TBD (Rail gun?) 
•  None have high speed. Cost $150-$200M each, total $6B  
•  Affordable but not intended to be expendable 
•  Operate in task-oriented squadrons, protected when necessary 
•  Numbers (12 each) are a SWAG taken from the NNFM study 
•  For aviation roles, see #7 below 
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3. Undersea Systems 
•  Submarines are back: central for the China and Arabian Seas 
•  Forty is not enough.  
•  But at $2.7B each, more than 40 SSNs is not affordable 
•  New undersea unmanned systems are already in development  
•  Addition of many small coastal non-nuclear SSKs is desirable 
•  Mix of 80 subs is affordable if SS cost < $0.8B (1/3 of SSN) 
•  SSNs have strategic mobility; SSKs in theater have ASUW 
focus 
•  Train both to attack warships and commerce in littoral waters 
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4. Amphibious Delivery Ships 
•  Take 10-year holiday on big amphibious assault ships 
–  Defers three ships and provides a $6.4B wedge through 2022 
–  Gives USMC a decade to decide on future roles and desired ships 
•  Funds:  
–  (1) 8 or more small, swift amphibious lift vessels and 
–  (1) many big RO/RO and container ships to deliver ground forces 
efficiently to friendly ports 
•  Together (1) & (2) support overseas contingencies of any size 
•  But they do not support large opposed assaults  
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5A. Blue Water Surface Combatants 
•  Basic issue: Offense has developed faster than defense with: 
–  Supersonic, low observable, sea skimming missiles 
–  Ballistic missiles with terminal homing 
–  Autonomous Harpies in large numbers to blind hard-kill defense radars 
–  Cooperating swarms of robotic systems are coming soon 
•  Start now to design an affordable replacement for DDG(X): 
–  Eight long range surface-to-surface missiles and 76 mm gun 
–  Self-defense suite of short range, fast acting, soft and hard kill 
–  ASW suite adapted from LCS module 
–  Modern IT suite including scalable AMDR 




5B. Surface Combatants (Continued) 
•  Frigate characteristics are approximations. It will take war 
games, campaign analyses, and design work to refine them 
•  Introduce frigates NLT 2031 when DDG(X) is programmed 
•  Use DDG(X) funds ($70B) as a production wedge  
•  Build 80 frigates at 6 a year, vice 30 DDG(X) at 2-3 a year 
•  About 3,000 tons, maximum crew 100 
•  Maintain about 30 area defense SAM ships (improved Aegis) 
for low threat regions  
•  Allow DDG/FF mix to evolve as threat evolves 
•  Serve both as escorts and Surface Strike Groups 
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6. CLF SHIPS 
 
•  Some small CLF ships are needed for littoral waters 
•  Assert 25 vice 31 large ships (T-AKE size) sufficient for future 
blue water operations 
•  Big, unescorted CLF ships likely Achilles heel of vulnerability 
•  Replace some with small ones, numbers TBD 
–  Preliminary NPS studies show fuel is the driving commodity 
–  Small CLF ships can be risked more readily 
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7. Sea Based Air Platforms 
•  Aircraft cost dominates ship cost; hence only 65 a/c per CVW 
•  Procurement of one CVN/CVW system costs about $20B 
•  11 CVNs looks unsustainable; but sea based air need persists 
•  NNFM keeps 6 CVNs, replaces 5 with many smaller carriers for less 
demanding scenarios—using $50B and 30K billets from the 5 CVNs 
•  No APN savings. Different aircraft distributed in smaller carriers 
•  Transition goal is a graceful reduction in big decks. 
•  CVLs can be nuclear powered if desirable. Biggest cost is a/c LCC 
•  Design new carriers for mission-oriented aircraft 
•  Can’t shape a ship transition until the aircraft side gets clearer: 
–  Roles and mix of UAVs and UCAVs cooperating with manned a/c 
–  Possibility of 3,000 ton CVE-X to carry 40-50 multi-capable BQMs 
–  Suitability of F-35B STOVL depends on cost, not performance 
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7. Strategic Deterrence Force 
•  Listed last because requirement is hopeless budget conundrum 
•  NNFM study put 10% SCN ceiling on strategic deterrent 
•  That bought only 9 SSBN at $4.5B & 9 TBMD ships at $2.2B 
•  Currently USN plans for 12 SSBN at $6.5B and unknown 
number of TBMD ships at around $4B.  
•  Would double NNFM cost 
•  Also should include cost of nuclear missiles carried 
•  A critical problem that must be solved.  
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Still Not Out of the Woods . . . 
•  This 7-step transition restores flexible responses for China and 
provides for an affordable presence anywhere 
•  It puts the US Navy in the missile age and prepares for the 
robotics age 
•  . . .takes SCN of $13.5B/year without strategic deterrent buys 
•  The Navy plan needs $15B without strategic deterrent buys 
•  Should the future SCN budget shrink to (say) $10B/year, even 




•  Building missile corvettes now opens all doors  
•  Green water ships with their large numbers and deployments 
forward complement the inevitably smaller blue water fleet 
•  Blue water fleet stays powerful and “over the horizon” 
•  Emphasis is on preserving maritime superiority over China 
•  But a bimodal fleet provides selective presence where needed, 
and blue water ships on demand 
•  Bimodal fleet supports maritime collaboration with friends, 
and helps create a “1,000 ship navy” worldwide  
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Wrap Up– The Real Transition 
•  The transition puts U. S. Navy in the missile age 
•  It puts some of our combat eggs in many smaller baskets 
•  Distributability is key:  
–  Tactical for missile age combat 
–  Operational for affordable presence anywhere, but not everywhere 
•  Simpler designs. Smaller unit cost. Shorter lifetimes. Single 
functions. Rapid adaptation to change. 
•  Exploits cyber and unmanned technology 
•  Anticipates the impending Era of Robots 
•  Success entails creating a cadre of professional sailors who 
know the technology and develop littoral doctrine & tactics 
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Post Script: Imagine a Third (?) Generation Squadron 
•  Suggested by participants, NPS Warfare Innovation Workshop 
•  The squadron comprises one manned and five almost identical 
optionally unmanned 200-ton vessels for littoral combat 
–  Offense: New generation hypersonic, low detectability, multi-warhead, 
medium range surface-to-surface missiles, some with anti-radiation, 
some carrying decoys 
–  Defense: automated decoys, electronic smoke for soft kill, laser gun 
–  Self-scouting with unmanned vehicles 
–  Modular for rapid plug-in upgrades 
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